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Abstract
Networks are at the core of modeling many engineering contexts, mainly in the case
of infrastructures and communication systems. The resilience of a network, which is
the property of the system capable of absorbing external shocks, is then of paramount
relevance in the applications. This paper deals with this topic by advancing a theo-
retical proposal for measuring the resilience of a network. The proposal is based on
the study of the shocks propagation along the patterns of connections among nodes.
The theoretical model is tested on the real-world instances of two important airport
systems in the US air traffic network; Illinois (including the hub of Chicago) and New
York states (with JFK airport).
Keywords: networks; resilience; paths; weighted arcs; air traffic systems.
1 Introduction
Networks are an important tool used to describe and analyze the structure and dynamical
behaviors of several complex systems found in the real world. In particular, network
∗Corresponding author.
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representation applies to transportation systems such as airline routes [12] and railroads
[23]; large communication infrastructures such as the World-Wide-Web [5] and the Internet
[15]; biological systems [4] such as gene and protein interaction networks [22] and many
social interaction structures [9], [16].
In the framework of networks, the interacting elements are depicted as nodes in the
system and their interactions are represented as links connecting the nodes. A relevant
issue relies to the behavior of networks with respect to the occurrence of external shocks.
In this respect, it is possible to distinguish the network’s robustness, i.e. the capacity
of the network to perform its basic functions even in the event of missing elements (nodes
or links) or, to phrase this concept differently, the ability of the system to tolerate strains
and to maintain its functionality in some way; and the network’s resilience, i.e. the ability
of a system to return to its normal state after a disturbance due to internal or external
shocks by altering its processes while continuing to perform [6], [17].
Literature on networks resilience is rather wide. At its core, shocks are interpreted as
the removal of nodes on the basis of several different criteria (see for example: [3], [10],
[11], [17]).
However, engineering applications reveal that shocks can not be associated forcefully
to the disappearance of nodes. One might experience the occurrence of a shock as a
perturbations whose size proxies the shock’s relevance. An example can be the loss of
capacity of an electricity plant due to adverse weather conditions and the corresponding
damage of the entire energy system.
The network resilience is considered crucial for the different practical approaches
whereby the criticalities related to the eventual failure of nodes and links and by means of
overall system tolerance. Disruptive events, whether a natural disaster, intentional attacks
or common failures, can have relevant impacts when they lead to the failure of network
elements. Indeed, network performances are directly related to their resilience and thus to
the abilities of networks in tolerating loss of important elements such as bridges or hubs
[11].
Resilience has been studied across several different network structures and there is
now knowledge regarding how specific types of networks react to specific kinds of losses
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[8]. Studies about this topic have considered a large variety of structural failures, both
induced by attack or naturally occurring, which involve nodes chosen by their central
position in the system, as well as those that are random.
However, the current literature on how to measure resilience is very limited [7]; [19]; [26]
with most contributions focusing on the remaining part of the network after the damage.
For example, some authors measured resilience through the number of node failures and
link failures that can occur for a system that is still functioning [20]; others proposed an
approach to evaluate the logistics of network resilience based on the redundant resource
and reliability of nodes and links [25]; Ash and Newth [1] used an algorithm to evolve
the complex systems that are resilient to cascading failure; Wang et al., [24] proposed a
measure based on the recovery ability of a system.
In this context, it is therefore relevant to analyze how an external shock that affects a
node propagates along the network paths.
The aim of this paper is to introduce a new analytical measure of resilience for weighted
networks that can be used when external shocks occur. The idea is to subject the network
to something akin to a load test and check how it responds.
Thus, we consider the resilience of a network as its ability to absorb a shock. We
introduce the concept of shock and the modality of its propagation, which is assumed to
depend strongly on the weights of the arcs. The presence of weights along the links allows
us to take into account the relevance given to the length of the paths between the nodes.
The intuitive basic idea is that a shock occurs at a single node and it propagates
from there over all the arcs, starting from the involved node. Once the shock reaches
the adjacents, it then proceeds to the adjacents of the adjacents, and so on. There is a
required condition for the propagation, based on the weights on the arcs. Substantially,
the shock propagates only if the propagating arcs have sufficient weight. Moreover, we
also assume that an amplifying/damping effect on the shock is in force on the basis of the
distance from the originating node. Details will be provided below.
We test the proposed measure of resilience on two empirical networks extracted from
the network of US commercial airports: the Illinois state network and the New York state
network.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides preliminaries and notations. Sec-
tion 3 focuses on the conceptualization of the proposed measure of the resilience. Section 4
shows the analysis of the resilience on two empirical networks. Section 5 offers concluding
remarks.
2 Preliminaries and notations
A network is an analytical-geometrical structure which is able to describe a set of inter-
connected elements in a unified system. The basis of a network is a graph G = (V,E),
where V is the set of n nodes (or vertices) and E is the set of m links (or arcs). The links
formalize the connections among the nodes.
Two generic nodes will be denoted by two integers i, j = 1, . . . , n. The presence of a
link between the nodes i and j will be captured through a binary variable aij which is 1
or 0 if the link does exist or not, respectively.
In so doing, we can fully identify E through the adjacency matrix A = (aij)i,j=1,...,n.
The proposed setting is grounded on networks which are weighted and oriented. Specif-
ically, two possible arcs connect i and j: the one from i to j and the one from j to i.
Accordingly, we will hereafter denote the arc from i to j by i → j. Moreover, arcs are
weighted by positive numbers which proxy the level of interaction among the nodes. We
denote the weight of the arc i → j by wij . In general, wij 6= wji. By assuming that
aij = 0 if and only if wij = 0, we can replace the matrix A with the more informative
weighted adjacency matrix W = (wij)i,j=1,...,n. Indeed, by employing such a matrix, one
can simultaneously identify the existing links and their corresponding weights.
The network is then N = (V,W).
Two arcs are said to be consecutive if they share exactly one of the two nodes com-
pounding them. Two consecutive arcs form a path of length 2 or, simply, a 2-path. A
generic 2-path with starting node i0 ∈ V can be written as p(2)i0 = {i0 → i1 → i2}, with
i0, i1, i2 being three distinct nodes in V and i0 → i1, i1 → i2 ∈ E.
Given an integer k ≥ 3, we can extend such a definition to the case of k-paths in a
natural way. A generic k-path with starting node i0 ∈ V is p(k)i0 = {i0 → i1 → · · · →
ik−1 → ik}, where i0, i1, . . . , ik−1, ik are distinct nodes in V and ih−1 → ih ∈ E, for each
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h = 1, . . . , k.
Under this definition, a 1-path is simply an arc in E.
We collect all the k-paths of N with starting node i0 in a set P(k)(i0). All the k-paths
of the network will be collected in
P(k) =
⋃
i0∈V
P(k)(i0). (1)
The weight of a k-path can be defined by the vector of the weights of the arcs composing
it. We denote such a weight by w(p
(k)
i0
) = (wi0i1 , wi1i2 , . . . , wik−1ik). A suitable aggregation
of the components of the weight of p
(k)
i0
will be discussed in the next section, in the context
of the propagation of the shocks in the network.
We also denote by k¯ the length of the longest k-path of the network.
3 The measure of the resilience
This section is devoted to the conceptualization of the measure of the resilience of the
network.
The resilience of a network describes its ability to absorb a shock. Therefore, in order
to provide a definition of resilience, one needs to introduce the concept of shock and also
the way in which it propagates in the network.
A shock is an external solicitation of one of the nodes of the network. Such a local
occurrence is able to destabilize the entire network by propagating over the other nodes
of the network. The destabilization of the network is strongly dependent on how shocks
propagate and, of course, on the entity of the shock. Indeed, shocks are not identical, and
they can be of different size. We measure the size of a shock by a scalar ξ ∈ [0,+∞), with
the conventional agreement that the higher the value of ξ, the more severe the occurred
shock. The case ξ = 0 is included for the sake of completeness, and it means no shock.
In this framework, we assume that the propagation of a shock occurring at a given
node i0 follows the route traced by the k-paths with starting node i0, and depends on the
values of the weights of the arcs of the k-path and on the distance of the nodes of the
k-path from the shocked node.
We enter the details.
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Consider an integer k and a k-path having, as a starting node, a node with a shock,
namely p
(k)
i0
= {i0 → i1 → · · · → ik−1 → ik} ∈ P(k)(i0). Hypothetically, the shock
propagates on a sequential basis: from i0 to i1, from i1 to i2 and so on, till the last node
ik. In real practice, the shock propagation is dampened or amplified – it depends on the
specific context – as the distance from the starting node grows. As we will see, such a
damping/amplifying effect might eradicate/exacerbate the action of the shock at nodes
that are far enough from i0.
The way the shock propagates is assumed to be captured by the weight w(p
(k)
i0
). This
is a natural requirement, in that the propagation of a shock from a node to another one
has necessarily to be related to the entity of the interaction between them.
According to these arguments, we introduce a discount factor δ ∈ [0,+∞), which de-
scribes the propagation motion of a shock with size ξ on p
(k)
i0
in a discrete time framework,
as follows:
• at time t = 0, the shock with size ξ0 = ξ occurs at i0 ∈ V ;
• at a generic time t = h, with 1 ≤ h ≤ k, the shock propagates to ih with size ξh, with
ξh = [ξh−1 +wih−1ih ]δ = ξ
∑
s=1h wis−1isδ
h−s+1. If h < k, then the shock propagates
to node ih+1 only if a propagation condition is satisfied (see below). Once the shock
ceases to propagate, the propagation motion stops.
Notice that δ ∈ (0, 1) is associated to a damping of the distance from the shocked node,
while δ > 1 captures an amplifying effect. The case δ = 0 is trivial, and means “no
propagation”, while δ = 1 means that the distance from the original node has no impact
on the propagation of the shock.
The propagation condition – PC, hereafter – is a requirement to be satisfied in order
to avoid the stopping of the propagation motion. In this model, we assume that the shock
propagates only if its size is large enough. By recalling that the longest k-paths in the
network are the ones with k = k¯, we introduce a vector of positive scalars Γ = (γ1, . . . γk¯) ∈
Rk¯.
Given h = 1, 2, . . . , k, we assume that the shock does not propagate to ih if and only
if there exists s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , h− 1 such that ξs < γs.
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Given Γ ∈ Rk¯ and ξ ∈ [0,+∞), if the shock is propagated till the last node ik, then we
say that p
(k)
i0
satisfies (Γ, ξ)−PC or, simply, p(k)i0 is (Γ, ξ)−PC. Vector Γ is the PC-vector
of the network N .
Notice that the thresholds γ’s can be taken as endogenous, and are fixed a priori. In
principle, they do not depend on the specific starting node i0. Therefore, we can identify
the PC of the entire network by defining the minimal values of the γ’s serving for the
propagation condition. We denote them by γ?’s and collect them in Γ? = (γ?1 , . . . γ
?
k¯
).
Vector Γ? could be defined as the critical PC-vector of the network N .
Clearly, specific values of Γ and ξ determine the set of the k-paths which are (Γ, ξ)−PC.
In this respect, fixed Γ ∈ Rk and ξ ∈ [0,+∞), we define
P(k)Γ,ξ =
⋃
i0∈V
{
p
(k)
i0
∈ P(k)(i0) : p(k)i0 is (Γ, ξ)− PC
}
. (2)
We can define the Γ− ξ-resilience of the network as the ability of the network to stop
the propagation of the shocks when the PC-vector is Γ? and the shocks have initial size
ξ0 = ξ.
The sets defined in (1) and (2) can be employed to provide a relative measure of the
resilience of N , once Γ and ξ are fixed. In particular, one can define the measure of the
Γ − ξ-resilience of N – and denote it by µ(Γ,ξ)(N) – as a weighted mean of the relative
number of the k-paths which are (Γ, ξ)− PC as k varies:
µ(Γ,ξ)(N) =
k¯∑
k=1
θk
|P(k)Γ,ξ |
|P(k)| , (3)
where the weights are collected in a vector of nonnegative scalars Θ = (θ1, . . . , θk¯) such
that
∑k¯
k=1 θk = 1. By construction, µ(Γ,ξ)(N) ∈ [0, 1], for each network N , Γ ∈ Rk¯ and
ξ ∈ [0,+∞). Such a property allows one to compare different networks in terms of their
abilities to absorb shocks.
Furthermore, the presence of the weights θ’s allows one to provide different conceptu-
alizations of Γ − ξ-resilient networks, on the basis of the relevance given to the length of
the paths.
The corner cases of µ(Γ,ξ)(N) = 0 and µ(Γ,ξ)(N) = 1 stand for the minimum and
maximum level of Γ− ξ-resilience, respectively. Indeed, in the former case the shocks with
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size ξ are immediately absorbed; in the latter case, any shock of size ξ propagates over all
the available paths.
Intuitively, µ(Γ,ξ)(N) decreases with respect to all the components of Γ and increases
with respect to ξ, because PC becomes more restrictive if the thresholds γ’s are large or
if the size of the shock is small.
4 Applications
Herein we considered the analysis of the resilience on two empirical networks extracted
from the network of US commercial airports [13]. The original US commercial airports
network has n = 500 nodes denoting airports and m = 2980 directed arcs representing
flight connections. In this network, weights are the number of daily flights available on
such connections in 2010. The network has both a small-world and scale-free organization
[2]. In particular, we present the cases of the airports in Illinois (IL) and New York
(NY) states. The selected networks are relatively small. This allows us to overcome the
computational complexity problems, since the computation of all the simple paths grows
exponentially with the size of the network [18]. However, the case studies regarding the
airports in Illinois and New York states can be considered of interest being that the two
airport hubs of Chicago (ORD according to International Air Transport Association -
IATA - code nome) and New York (JFK) are extremely crucial in US air traffic network.
The subnetwork extracted for IL is composed of 12 nodes and 51 arcs with k¯ = 4 while
the NY subnetwork is composed of 21 nodes and 89 connection arcs with k¯ = 8. Figures 1
and 2 show, respectively, the visualizations of relative networks overlapped on the maps
of NY and IL states.
The data processing, the network analysis and all simulations are conducted using the
software R [21] with the igraph package [14]. The datasets were obtained from the R pack-
ege tnet authored by Tore Opsahl (http://toreopsahl.com). Code in the R programming
language is available upon request.
Formulas (2) and (3) were implemented in an algorithm which takes as input the
network N under observation and some different settings as follows.
We consider three different settings for Γ, in particular: Γ1 = {γi = 1, i = 1, ..., k¯}, i.e.
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Figure 1: Map of airports and routes for Illinois state.
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Figure 2: Map of airports and routes for New York state.
the propagation thresholds are low and a large number of shocks propagate; more than
this, all the shocks propagate when δ = 1; Γ2 = {γi = 1, i = 1, ..., dk¯/2e and γi = 2i−dk¯/2e+1
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for i = dk¯/2e+1, ..., k¯}, i.e shocks propagation becomes more difficult as the distance from
the shocked nodes increases; finally, Γ3 = {γi = 2bk¯/2c−i+1 for i = 1, .., bk¯/2c and γi = 1,
i = bk¯/2c+ 1, ..., k¯}, i.e. the propagation is obstructed along shortest simple paths with a
decreasing geometric evolution.
Regarding the weights in Θ, we considered as first setting Θ1 whose i-th component
is θi = 1/k¯, for i = 1, . . . , k¯; a second is Θ2 with θi = 1/2
i for each i = 1, ..., k¯ − 1 and
θk¯ = θk¯−1; a third setting is Θ3 with θi = 1/2k¯−i+1 for each i = 2, ..., k¯ − 1 and θ1 = θ2.
In the last two settings, coefficients are taken from a geometric progression of decreasing
and increasing type, respectively, while the first one is associated to uniform values of θ’s.
Finally, for the computation of the µ(Γ,ξ)(N), we considered ξ = {0, 1, 2, . . . , 10} and
δ = {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1}, thus we performed 121 computations for each network. The higher
values of ξ were chosen in order to be greater than k¯.
4.1 Illinois state network
Figure 3 reports the results for the IL airports for Γ1 and the three different settings of Θ.
All the cases share the intuitive behavior of the resilience such that for small values of the
ξ’s and δ’s, the value of µ(Γ,ξ)(N) is small and increases with respect to δ and ξ, becoming
equals to 1 when δ and ξ are large enough. However, some remarkable differences emerge.
For cases Θ1 and Θ3, small values of the discount factor leads to hard shock prop-
agation, even if the size of the shock is large. This is not longer true for Θ2, where an
enlargement of the shock is able to increase the level of the resilience also when the dis-
count factor is at a low level. This outcome is due to the more prominent role played by
the shortest paths in the first and third setting when compared to the second one, where
the shortest paths are strongly penalized by the weights. In this respect, one should also
consider that the action of the discount is more evident as the distance with the shocked
node increases.
Similar arguments can also explain the discrepancies in the rate of growth of the
resilience with respect to δ. Indeed, the increase µ(Γ,ξ)(N) is faster for Θ3, while the lower
rate can be observed in the Θ2 case. Specifically, for Θ3 and for each value of ξ, we can
identify the resilience as collapsing to a certain degree, with the network passing rapidly
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from resilience equal to 1 to very low resilience when δ moves slightly below 0.5.
The same collapse of the resilience can be observed for all the cases when the size of
the shock goes below 2. Thus, one can argue that there exists a critical threshold for the
shock leading to unitary resilience, for each value of the discount factor. This is totally
in agreement with Γ1, which has components with minimum value. In the specific case
of the IL airports, it is then associated to the propagation of all the shocks large enough
when δ < 1 or all the shocks when δ = 1.
When we consider Γ2 (see Figure 4), the γ’s are constant for the first k¯/2 values, and
then they start to grow; thus, we are penalizing longest simple paths. In this case (with
Θ1), the effect of δ is more prominent than the one of ξ, and µ(Γ,ξ)(N) tends to 1 for high
values of δ. Such a trend can be observed also for Θ2 and Θ3. However, Θ2 is much more
similar to Θ1 than Θ3, because its longest paths are penalized from the γ’s also in this
setting; thus, the damping effect of the second part of Θ2 in the weight vector seems to be
hardly noticeable. The penalization of the longest path is also the reason for the absence
of an evident collapse effect for Θ3, because shock propagation is impeded on longest paths
by γ’s and on shortest paths by θ’s.
The third setting of Γ is associated to the penalization of the shortest simple paths,
so that the shock does not propagate unless it has a high value and the discount factor is
high as well. Figure 5 reports the results, which are similar for all settings of Θ.
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Figure 3: µ(Γ,ξ)(N) values in case of IL state airports for Γ1 and Θ1 (left), Θ2 (center)
and Θ3 (right).
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Figure 4: µ(Γ,ξ)(N) values in case of IL state airports for Γ2 and Θ1 (left), Θ2 (center)
and Θ3 (right).
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Figure 5: µ(Γ,ξ)(N) values in case of IL state airports for Γ3 and Θ1 (left), Θ2 (center)
and Θ3 (right).
4.2 New York state network
In Figure 6 we report the results for Γ1 for the NY state airport network. The behavior
is very similar to the previous network in both settings of Θ (see Figure 3) but for Θ3 the
collapse effect of the resilience is very clear for δ going above 0.4.
When we set Γ2 we note that for Θ1 the behavior is similar to the IL network, even
if the level of the resilience of the NY network is below that of IL (compare Figure 7
with Figure 4). When we consider Θ2, the surface is smoothed in comparison to the same
case for the IL network and it is quite similar to the Γ1 setting. For Θ3, the values of
µ(Γ,ξ)(N) are equal to 1 only for high values of ξ and δ. Indeed, the action of the γ’s,
which contribute to deteriorating the resilience of the networks at the short paths level,
is more effective than that of the θ’s, which reduce the relevance of the the short paths in
the definition of µ(Γ,ξ)(N).
Comparison results between NY and IL networks can be explained by their dimensions,
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being that k¯ = 8 for the former and k¯ = 4 for the latter. In the same light, one should
interpret also the case of Γ3.
Indeed, when considering the NY airports, all the values of µ(Γ,ξ)(N) are equal to 0
and Figures are not shown. In this setting one has γ1 > 10, which is the maximum value
of the available ξ, so that propagation cannot occur.
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Figure 6: µ(Γ,ξ)(N) values in case of NY state airports for Γ1 and Θ1 (left), Θ2 (center)
and Θ3 (right).
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Figure 7: µ(Γ,ξ)(N) values in case of NY state airports for Γ2 and Θ1 (left), Θ2 (center)
and Θ3 (right).
5 Conclusive remarks
The analysis of the resilience of networks and their attitude to wards absorbing external
shocks is crucial for the various implications related to reliability and functionality of
real-world engineering systems.
The aim of this paper is to propose a new measure of network resilience based on the
study of the shocks propagation along the patterns of connections among nodes.
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In our setting, shocks are assumed to have a positive size and a tendency of not nec-
essarily removing nodes from the network. They propagate in an amplified or dampened
way through a suitably defined discount factor, with such a propagation proceeding under
the fulfilment of a predefined condition involving the size of the shocks and the weights of
the arcs.
The resilience measure is conceptualized as a weighted combination of the cardinality
of the sets collecting the paths with different lengths, whereby the weights are able to
assign relevance to the short or long paths in the networks.
We test the measure on two real airport systems. The comparison between the empir-
ical instances suggests the incidence of the size of the network on shock propagation, as
well as on the resilience. Indeed, for large networks, propagation suffers from difficulty in
reaching nodes that are far in respect to the others.
Results state that the resilience is strongly dependent on the weights associated to
the short paths, and highlight a prominent role of the discount factor in determining the
ability of the network to absorb shocks. This behavior suggests that it is possible to
design resilient network, with a strong ability to absorb external shocks, by imposing a
propagation pattern on the basis of a certain level of the discount factor.
The proposed resilience measure might then be of usefulness to the engineers for the
identification of the vulnerabilities of systems and for designing more resilient infrastruc-
tures.
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